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which has been available since 1992, EB 
activates when a state’s total 
unemployment rate (TUR) reaches 6.5 
percent and is at least 10 percent higher 
than in either of the two previous years. 
(The TUR is based on the Current 
Population Survey and published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. In contrast, the 
IUR is based entirely on UI program 
data.) 
Unlike standby EB, emergency benefit 
extensions are enacted by Congress on an 
ad hoc basis rather than being triggered 
automatically. There have been seven 
such extensions, from the Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation Act of 
1958 through the Temporary Extended 
Unemployment Compensation of 2002 
(TEUC), which was enacted and became 
effective in March 2002, when it became 
evident that the labor market would not 
recover quickly following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.2 The 
program has extended exhaustees’ 
benefits in all states by 50 percent of their 
regular benefit duration, up to 13 weeks. 
It also has provided up to an additional 13 
weeks of benefits in states where standby 
EB had triggered on or the IUR was at 
least 4 percent and at least 20 percent 
higher than its average in the same period 
of the previous two years. A total of 12 
states paid these additional benefits under 
TEUC at some point, although by 
December 2002, only three (Alaska, 
Oregon, and Washington) were doing so. 
The program is financed entirely from the 
federal Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Account (EUCA). 
The original TEUC program expired at 
the end of 2002, but Congress extended it 
at the beginning of 2003. As a result, 
workers with remaining TEUC balances 
at the end of 2002 could continue to draw 
emergency extended benefits. Also, new 
exhaustees of regular benefits can claim 
TEUC through the last week of May 2003 
and can draw TEUC benefits through the 
end of August 2003. However, the TEUC 
extension did not provide additional 
benefits to workers who exhausted their 
TEUC benefits. 
Early predictions that the current 
recession would be short-lived now 
appear to have been overly optimistic. 
Labor markets recovered slowly 
following the recession of the early 
1990s, and this recession shows signs of a 
similar pattern. Since September 2002, 
over 41 percent of Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) recipients have been 
exhausting their regular UI benefits, an 
all-time high. Also, in the last year, more 
than 20 percent of the unemployed have 
been jobless for longer than 26 weeks, the 
first time this has occurred since 1994.
The problem of long-term 
unemployment is serious at all times but 
typically gains attention only during 
recessions. Here, we discuss the ability of 
the UI system to address long-term 
unemployment. 
Unemployment Insurance can be 
viewed as a three-tiered program. The 
“regular” benefits that are financed and 
administered by each state constitute the 
program’s first tier. The second tier of the 
UI system is the permanent or “standby” 
extended benefit program (standby EB), 
which Congress established in 1970. The 
standby EB program is intended to 
activate automatically when 
unemployment rises, extending the 
potential duration of a worker’s benefits 
by 50 percent (up to 13 weeks). The third 
tier of the UI system is made up of the 
“emergency” benefit extensions that 
Congress has enacted in every recession 
since 1958. These emergency extensions 
have varied greatly in their generosity, 
financing, and eligibility criteria. 
How Extended Benefits Work
Standby EB, the second tier of the UI 
system, is a permanent extended benefits 
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program that is intended to activate 
automatically in a recession—rather than 
requiring congressional discretion and 
action—and is financed half-and-half by 
the states and the federal government. 
(Regular UI benefits are financed out of 
state UI trust funds, whereas most 
emergency extended benefits have been 
financed out of the federal UI trust fund.) 
Weekly benefits under standby EB are the 
same as weekly benefits under the regular 
state program. 
Originally, standby EB was activated 
in a given state whenever the state’s 13-
week average insured unemployment rate 
(IUR) reached 4 percent and was at least 
20 percent higher than its average in the 
same period of the previous two years 
(see Table 1, which summarizes this and 
subsequent extended benefit triggers). 
Also, it was activated nationally 
whenever the 13-week average of the 
national IUR reached 4 percent. However, 
in 1980 and 1981, Congress enacted three 
changes that made it more difficult for the 
standby EB program to activate—the IUR 
needed to activate EB on a state-specific 
basis was increased from 4 percent to 5 
percent, the trigger that had activated EB 
nationally was eliminated, and the 
definition of insured unemployment was 
revised so as to omit EB claimants from 
the calculation, reducing the IUR in times 
when EB was activated.1 
In addition to the standard IUR trigger, 
states currently have the option of 
choosing either of two alternative EB 
triggers. Under the first, which has been 
available since 1981, EB activates when a 
state’s IUR reaches 6 percent. Under this 
IUR trigger, the IUR need not exceed its 
level in earlier years for EB to trigger. 
Under the second alternative trigger, 
5Employment Research APRIL 2003
1990s (Woodbury and Vroman 2003; 
Walters and Wenger 2003). 
However, the demise of standby EB 
has two underlying causes. First, labor 
markets have been stronger since 1985 
than they were between 1970 and 1985. 
Second, the financing of standby EB is 
shared by the states and the federal 
government, whereas emergency 
extensions have been federally funded. 
With Congress willing to pass emergency 
extensions, the states have not pressured 
Congress to revise the standby EB 
triggers so that the program activates 
more frequently. Indeed, during 2002 
governors could, and did, terminate 
standby EB in states where it had 
triggered on as soon as the current 
emergency extension (TEUC) passed. 
This shifted the financing of extended 
benefits from the states to the federal 
government. 
One could possibly argue that the 
demise of the standby EB program is an 
appropriate outcome—if unemployment 
has fallen secularly, then the demand for 
unemployment insurance would also fall. 
However, Congress has continued to pass 
emergency benefit extensions in each 
recession, essentially ignoring the 
downward trend in the unemployment 
rate and gauging the need for extended 
benefits with an eye to the median 
Trends in Extended Benefits Payments
In the recessions of the mid 1970s and 
the early 1980s, the standby EB program 
was a significant source of benefits for 
unemployed workers, as shown in 
Figure 1. However, standby EB has 
activated rarely since 1981 and was a 
negligible source of benefits during both 
the recession of the early 1990s and the 
current recession. 
In a mechanical sense, the reasons for 
the demise of the standby EB program are 
clear. First, as mentioned above, Congress 
revised the triggers in 1981 so as to make 
it more difficult for EB to activate. This 
policy choice was based on the belief that 
the existing triggers resulted in an EB 
program with work disincentive effects 
that were unacceptably high. Second, 
insured unemployment rates, which are 
used to trigger EB, have shown a 
downward trend over the last two decades 
(Vroman 2002). Even if the triggers had 
not been revised in 1981, the standby EB 
program would have activated less 
frequently in the past 20 years than before. 
Simulations we have run suggest that, 
under the original standby EB trigger (4 
percent IUR with a 20 percent increase), 
EB would have activated in only 11 states 
during 2001–2002, covering even fewer 
unemployed workers and UI exhaustees 
than it did during the recession of the early 
duration of unemployment and the UI 
exhaustion rate, both of which have 
trended up over time.3 As Figure 1 shows, 
the demise of standby EB has been 
accompanied by the rise of emergency 
federal UI extensions. 
Policy Alternatives
Two obvious policy options exist for 
addressing long-term unemployment. The 
first is to expand and/or extend the current 
emergency extension (TEUC), which 
provides 13 weeks of extended benefits in 
most states and is set to expire in May 
2003. As yet, there is little evidence of 
improvement in the labor market, and 
roughly half of all TEUC recipients have 
exhausted their emergency benefits. This 
suggests that Congress should consider 
expanding TEUC to provide an additional 
10 to 13 weeks of benefits to workers who 
have exhausted their TEUC benefits. It 
also suggests that an extension of the 
existing TEUC program through the end 
of 2003 may well be needed. 
A second option is to revive the 
standby EB program and make it a 
significant source of extended benefits 
during recessions. This option would 
require a rethinking of both the financing 
and the triggering of standby EB. How to 
finance extended benefits—whether 
federally or by the states—has been a 
source of contention for decades 
(Blaustein 1993). However, the shared 
state–federal financing of standby EB has 
been the downfall of standby EB, and 
Congress has been willing repeatedly to 
finance emergency extensions federally. It 
is time for Congress to acknowledge that 
the financing of benefits beyond 26 weeks 
is a federal responsibility and to make the 
standby EB program federally funded. 
Reviving standby EB would also 
require Congress to lower the IUR trigger, 
lower the alternative TUR trigger and 
make it mandatory rather than optional, or 
adopt a new EB trigger, such as the UI 
exhaustion rate. The automatic triggering 
of standby EB has three advantages over 
emergency extensions. First, emergency 
extensions are subject to a “recognition 
lag”—it takes time for Congress to 
recognize the onset of a recession and to 
enact legislation, so there may be a long 
Table 1 Triggers Used to Activate Standby Extended Benefits and TEUC
Trigger                               Description                                                         When in effect       
4% IUR with 20% 
increase
State IUR of at least 4%. Also, IUR must 
be at least 20% higher than its average in 
the same period of the previous two years.
EB, 8/70 to 8/81
TEUC, 3/02 to 5/03
5% IUR with 20% 
increase
State IUR of at least 4%; must be at least 
20% higher than its average in same 
period of the previous two years.
EB, 8/81 to present
4.5% national IUR National IUR of at least 4.5% (no increase 
specified)
EB, 8/70 to 8/81
5% IUR State IUR of at least 5% (no increase 
specified)
EB, 1976 to 8/81 
(state option)
6% IUR State IUR of at least 6% (no increase 
specified)
EB, 8/81 to present 
(state option)
6.5% TUR with 
10% increase
State TUR of at least 6.5%; must also be at 
least 10% higher than in the same period 
of one of the previous two years.
EB, 6/92 to present 
(state option)
NOTE: IUR is the insured unemployment rate; TUR is the total unemployment rate; EB is the
standby extended benefits program; TEUC is the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compen-
sation program that came into effect in March 2002 and is scheduled to expire in May 2003.
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Notes
1. In addition, more stringent eligibility and dis-
qualifying conditions were imposed on EB claim-
ants. These changes were part of a broader effort by
the then-new Reagan administration and Congress
to reduce expenditures on domestic programs.
2. For a summary of the emergency extensions
up to TEUC, see Woodbury and Rubin (1997).
3.  The UI exhaustion rate peaked at 38.2 percent
in 1975, 40.8 percent in 1983, 40.1 percent in 1993,
and 42.7 percent in 2002. 
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lag between the onset of slack labor 
markets and the availability of extended 
benefits. Second, emergency extensions 
have been politically difficult to shut 
down; as a result, they may continue to 
pay extended benefits beyond the time 
when labor markets have recovered and 
when workers can reasonably be expected 
to find reemployment. Third, emergency 
extensions have usually been made 
effective on the date of enactment, 
leaving UI administrators little or no time 
to implement the new program. For all 
these reasons, emergency extensions are 
likely to be less efficient than automatic 
extensions. 
In January 2003, a third possible 
option was proposed: the Bush 
Administration’s Personal Reemployment 
Accounts (PRAs). The PRA proposal has 
three main features. First, certain UI 
claimants would be identified as “likely 
to exhaust” their regular benefits. Second, 
for these claimants, an account of up to 
$3,000 would be established to buy 
intensive reemployment services, 
training, and other services like 
transportation or child care, at the 
claimant’s discretion. Third, if the 
claimant returns to work within 13 weeks 
of receiving the first UI payment, he or 
she would keep whatever balance 
remained in the PRA. This last feature 
creates an incentive for rapid 
reemployment and gives PRAs the flavor 
of a reemployment bonus, which has been 
extensively studied in randomized trials 
(Robins and Spiegelman 2001). 
The size of the worker-managed 
account—$3,000—suggests that the PRA 
is being put forward as an alternative to a 
further extension of TEUC (13 weeks at 
the national average weekly benefit 
amount of $230 is roughly $3,000). 
However, eligibility for PRAs would be 
restricted to about 12 percent of new UI 
recipients (President’s Council of 
Economic Advisers 2003), while UI 
exhaustion rates are currently in excess of 
40 percent. Whatever the merits of PRAs 
as a reemployment policy for workers who 
are likely to benefit from reemployment 
assistance and training when labor 
markets are tight, PRAs cannot be viewed 
as a substitute for extended benefits when 
labor markets are slack. 
Long-term unemployment is a problem 
that is generally neglected until it 
becomes acute, as it does in recessions. 
The PRA is a proposal that has the 
potential to help long-term unemployed 
workers throughout the business cycle 
and to shorten their unemployment spells. 
However, it should not be confused with 
short-term measures like benefit 
Figure 1 UI Benefits, by Type, 1970–2002
